Recent news stories regarding the “potential” loss of the Maine Guard’s 133rd Engineer Battalion have left me both surprised and outraged.
I am disappointed by the near-hysterical newswriting, which has been rife with factual inaccuracies, anonymous sources and misleading statements. It seems the progression of this “breaking story” has shifted from a discussion of military force management to the character assassinations of our most capable leaders.
The writers at the Portland Press Herald have failed in their obligation to truly examine the fact-based realities of this complex subject in favor of a sophomoric oversimplification bordering on tabloid journalism.
As the former assistant adjutant general for the Army National Guard, I have served with the Adjutant General Jim Campbell and Chief of Staff Colonel Jack Mosher. Both of these officers worked for me directly in a variety of assignments over the past 20 years. They are well respected and two of the most capable officers in the nation. To portray these senior officers as reckless, infantry zealots driven by self-interest is absurd.
Having been in their shoes, I understand how difficult it is to develop long-range plans that are driven by congressional agendas, state politics, active Army directives, reduced resources and oversight by the National Guard Bureau in Arlington, Virginia. It also is unfortunate that a few former senior leaders of the Maine Army Guard failed to address many of these challenges, only to become some of Campbell and Mosher’s most outspoken critics.
The Guard has changed dramatically over the last 25 years from its traditional community-based posture to its role as the Army’s combat reserve and is primarily trained and equipped to fight beside active forces. As the Army changes, so, too, must the Maine Guard, which requires foresight and leadership.
The Maine Guard has suffered a precipitous decline in strength in the past 20 years with the loss of an engineer group, a second engineer battalion, a field artillery battalion, an air traffic control company and many other units often upon their return from combat theaters. It is time to reverse this downward spiral with a realistic view of needs of the Army as the driving force for decision-making, not sentiment and antiquated models that are no longer relevant.
The question is not “will” the Guard change but more a question of “how.” In the aftermath of our conflicts in the Gulf and Afghanistan, the Army is transitioning “heavy forces” in favor of “lighter” units such as infantry and special operations forces. Even if there are no national reductions in the Guard, the Army can still restation forces at will.
Engineer units are part of those “heavy” forces that are being divested or moved at the national level. While the oversimplification of this complex issue makes for easy reading, many other variables such as brigade affiliation, resource management, training area availability, equipment density and long-term readiness are the Army’s primary considerations.
The argument that an entire engineer battalion is vital to the state of Maine in the event of a natural or community service projects is a thread-worn debate that doesn’t reflect the historical usage nor the reality of today’s requirements. The development of the Department of Homeland Security, regional partnerships, civil industry, contractors, emergency management assistance compacts and multi-agency contingency plans all drive modern disaster relief operations with the National Guard’s most important asset being general purpose forces, such as infantry and military police.
Despite the reduced relevance of an engineer force structure, Campbell has responsibly directed the retention of a robust engineer capability in the Maine Guard proportional to the historic needs of the state in both disaster response and community service projects.
I can assure you that these discussions and studies have gone back years in Maine seeking a viable force structure stationing plan that both supports the needs of the Army and the residents of the state. We can debate the merits of parallel planning tracks built around a changing national directive, but to directly target our senior leaders is intellectually irresponsible and directly undermines the good order and discipline of Maine’s military leadership.
Campbell and Mosher have long histories of successful strategic leadership and are officers of impeccable character. Many of the changes they are implementing are difficult organizationally but, in my opinion, long overdue. Now that Gov. Paul LePage has authorized Campbell to speak publicly on this matter, I encourage him to provide Maine’s residents with a candid understanding of this entire situation.
Given this opportunity, he will set the record straight rather than relying solely on those who may have an axe to grind or others who are perpetuating this emotional issue with an uninformed bias.
Rob Carmichael is retired brigadier general of the Maine Army National Guard.