Congress will investigate Russian hacking of the Democratic and Republican presidential campaigns, but we already know the internet creates vulnerabilities. The divide between domestic and foreign affairs is blurred in a globalizing world, and weak states can employ asymmetric cyber capabilities to level the field of competition.
Last week’s intelligence assessment made clear Russia’s intervention in the U.S. election began in the summer 2015, long before Donald Trump emerged as the likely Republican nominee, and lasted until “at least June 2016.” What started as an effort to delegitimize the U.S. electoral process turned into an effort to affect the outcome of the vote by selectively leaking embarrassing information stolen by Russia’s military intelligence.
There is no evidence the Russians succeeded in penetrating voter databases or in altering the election results, and it is hard to say what impact Russia’s intervention had on the election. Understandably, President Trump is sensitive about such questions, but there are broader issues the new administration must face.
The reality is that Moscow’s goal is to limit the U.S. role in the world and discredit democracy. Why? Putin views democracy as an existential threat to Russia’s autocracy, and NATO as a barrier to Moscow’s influence. Putin believes the U.S. — especially former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — played a leading role in the Moscow demonstrations in late 2011 and early 2012 that protested the Russian presidential election in which Putin and Dmitry Medvedev switched roles as prime minister and president. In fact, there is an element of truth in Putin’s perception, if one looks at the Obama administration’s public statements and leaks to the media.
There is nothing new in that because the U.S. for decades has actively promoted democracy overseas and spoken out against the suppression of democratic rights. These values are enshrined in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Putin and his followers view another international agreement, the 1976 Helsinki Final Act that established what today is the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as having contributed to the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. That agreement recognized political rights as a legitimate topic of concern for member states, which included nearly all European countries. The Helsinki Final Act inspired dissidents in Eastern Europe to establish Helsinki Watch committees that documented human rights violations and evolved into democratic-nationalist movements. In the past, democracy promotion overseas carried a small price tag at home, but that’s not the case today.
The U.S. and its allies have been slow to develop a cyber-deterrence strategy. During the Cold War, the U.S. deterred Soviet military aggression by demonstrating a willingness and capacity to inflict unacceptable retaliation if attacked. President Barack Obama’s public declaration that the U.S. will respond in a time and manner of its choosing is a good first step, and imposing travel and financial sanctions against individual Russian officials responsible for the attack also demonstrates a seriousness of purpose. But an effective strategy requires more.
This will fall to the Trump administration, which faces a conundrum: on the one hand, Trump says he wants to improve U.S.-Russian relations, and on the other, Russia’s actions pose a threat to U.S. sovereignty and security. Public opinion and Congress, as well as his the intelligence, defense and foreign policy bureaucracies, will compel him to respond to the cyber threat, which involves more countries than just Russia.
The U.S. will need to take the lead in developing a broad understanding — shared by Moscow and Beijing, among others — that covert intervention in another’s internal politics constitutes an act of aggression. Admittedly, this would be welcomed by Putin and also have implications for U.S. foreign policy, which funds pro-democracy NGOs and civil society entities around the world. Russia already prevents NGOs from receiving foreign funding. Pro-democracy groups are viewed as a threat by autocratic leaders, not least in China.
An effective U.S. strategy should deter cyber-interventions in internal politics and also minimize the incentives for such attacks. Such an approach would resemble the role the U.S. played in its first 170 years: serving as an example and not as a participant in advancing democracy overseas. Elections are scheduled this year in France and Germany, where Moscow also is trying to affect the outcomes. The stakes could be high, including the fate of the North Atlantic alliance.
Kenneth Hillas is a retired U.S. diplomat and adjunct professor in University of Maine’s School of Policy and International Affairs.