The BDN Opinion section operates independently and does not set news policies or contribute to reporting or editing articles elsewhere in the newspaper or on bangordailynews.com
Kenneth Hillas Jr. is a retired senior diplomat who is an adjunct professor at the University of Maine’s Graduate School of Policy and International Affairs. The views expressed in this column are the author’s and do not represent those of the university.
Russia’s objectives in the Ukraine crisis remain unclear, and President Vladimir Putin is keeping the West guessing. Is it to invade Ukraine, replace the Ukrainian government with a puppet regime, upending the modern European order by realizing Putin’s desire for a Russian sphere of “privileged interest” in the area of the former Soviet Union? Or is the aim more limited — to apply enough pressure to fracture and destabilize the Ukrainian government, while effectively taking Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership off the table? Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky’s public support has declined during the crisis, as the economy falters, the national currency (hryvnia) weakens, interest rates rise; not surprisingly, public anxiety has grown.
Moscow’s military deployments, more than 130,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders, make an invasion at any time possible, but it also increases the pressure on Kyiv. On the question of NATO membership for Ukraine, Putin has already achieved that goal as NATO does not admit new members embroiled in armed conflict.
War in Ukraine would entail considerable political and economic costs for Russia, even though its economic policies of “isolationomics” have reduced its exposure to senactions. Russia has also built up its foreign currency reserves to more than $600 billion, giving it a cushion against sanctions. Of course, sanctions entail costs for countries that impose them. How long would European states be willing to forego Russian gas in the winter? Alternative sources of natural gas would not fully compensate for the loss of Russian gas. U.S. secondary sanctions against Russia would prevent European banks from financing business by or with Russia. This would pinch European corporations, but their exposure in Russia has diminished since 2014.
A majority of Russians are opposed to war with Ukraine, which would likely bring significant Russian casualties. However, Putin views a democratic and free Ukraine as a danger to his own autocratic regime because of Russia’s ties of kinship, related languages and culture. Russia’s elite are convinced that U.S. support for Ukraine is a part of a larger effort to foment a so-called color revolution in Russia. This perception is central to Putin’s calculus and poses the biggest obstacle to a political solution. If it comes to war, Moscow will have to crack down even harder on its domestic opposition, fueling the very danger of instability Putin so fears.
With a newly modernized military to back up Russian diplomacy, Putin is also pursuing a long-standing Russian strategic goal — to undermine European solidarity and also drive a wedge between it and the U.S. To drive home Europe’s lack of strategic autonomy, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed French President Emmanuel Macron’s efforts last week to achieve a Russian commitment on de-escalation, observing that Macron is not the leader of NATO.
An invasion of Ukraine would not be a cakewalk and Russian casualties would likely be significant. Ukraine’s armed forces are better trained and equipped, and would inflict losses on Russian forces in the event of a conflict. Significant Russian casualties could undermine Putin’s standing with the Russian public, and he isn’t known for actions that put his regime at risk. Still Putin does not consider Ukraine to be a truly independent country but rather a junior Slavic, constituent part of Russia.
The U.S. and NATO have not offered concessions to Russia’s security demands, but have left the door open to diplomatic discussions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes all European and former Soviet Republics, is a natural forum for doing so. The challenge will be to provide a diplomatic off-ramp for Putin. One step would be the implementation of the Minsk II agreement, but it is hated by most of Ukrainians and only signed in 2015 under coercion.
On Feb. 14, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov underscored the need to continue talks on Ukraine, and the next day the Defense Ministry said some soldiers had completed military exercises and would return to barracks, which won’t take them far from Ukraine’s border. At the same time, the Russian parliament (Duma) in an advisory resolution called on Putin to recognize the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, the breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, stepping up the political pressure on Zelensky. Notwithstanding the developments in recent days, the strategic equation remains unchanged, and there are chapters in this story still to be written.